SRV Theory: The Challenge of Making The Case

A Discussion Paper

Citation: Kendrick, Michael “SRV Theory: The Challenge Of Making The Case” Proceedings: Sharing The Road Conference, Brisbane, Australia, 2001

Draft: June 2001

Paper Prepared By:

Michael J. Kendrick PhD

4 Bullard Ave.,

Holyoke, MA USA 01040

Tel/fax 413 533 8071

Email: kendrickconsult@attglobal.net

Introduction

The broad and sometimes fractious field of disability is currently in the throes of a generational shift from the “baby boom” generation to whatever may come to replace it. In ideological, theoretical and political terms, such transitions typically have a way of opening up many of the “givens” of a field to reconsideration. SRV theory has played a reasonably prominent and central role in the field up to the moment, but its continuity in this status is by no means assured. Like any other claim on the loyalties of people, it must periodically be subjected to the kind of probing and testing commensurate with its ambitions. This paper will examine the scope of the challenges it must rise to if its present central role in the field is to continue. Whether the theory and its proponents can successfully make their case at this important historical juncture is unknown at this point. However, the challenges that SRV faces are very much of the same order as other aspirant theories will undoubtedly face, and thus much can be learned from the case example of SRV theory and its search for a renewed future constituency.

The central concern of social role valorisation theory (SRV) has been the effects of social devaluation on the well being of individuals and groups that society regards negatively. This concern has been translated into various propositions as to what might be done to alleviate or even reverse the underlying social devaluation as well as its existential effects. These include the raising of consciousness, the challenging of stigmatising beliefs and perceptions, the assurance to affected persons of valued social roles, the shifting of role expectations, the adoption of a developmental model, the pursuit of social inclusion and valued social participation and the exercise of caution in subjecting socially devalued persons to strategies that might worsen the rejection and neglect of society. While these action propositions may occasionally be the target of criticism, they are largely uncontroversial as practical suggestions for making social change.

Nonetheless, SRV does attract its share of critics overall, as do most theories put forward to change our world. This dissent is actually quite healthy, as it allows people a chance to both more carefully examine matters and evolve their own sense of what their options are. In fact, SRV theory has enjoyed considerable, but by no means universal support, from many quarters, as being a kind of major orienting theory for the disability field in particular. Thus it is timely to consider the question of what might be involved in SRV being able to continue to enjoy this support as well as possibly expand its base.

This question might be approached on various levels. Certainly, this would include its moral and practical significance for the lives of people who are experiencing social devaluation, the perceptions it has created of itself in various constituencies in the field and the effect of these on support for the theory, its rationally established substantive merits, its prominence and accessibility, and lastly, its capacity to adapt to the changing realities of the field. These dimensions are not unique to solely appraising SRV theory, as they would be relevant to any theory that claims the overarching role for itself that SRV theory has done. After all, the bigger the claim upon people’s trust, the greater the stringency of the tests that ought to be applied.

Establishing Moral and Practical Relevance

Theories are human creations, and can take on considerable moral significance depending upon whether they ultimately benefit people and their well-being or not. If they cause harm, as have the eugenics and racial theories of both past and recent times, then such theories might properly be discarded as being injurious to humans, particularly those who are socially marginalized and devalued by society. If, on the other hand, they usher in new possibilities for human potential and development, defend the humanity of people and challenge their mistreatment then their moral track record would be evaluated quite differently.

In the case of SRV theory, it is quite legitimate to claim that the theory does have a moral history, to-date, that is undeniably on the side of expanding options for people and advancing respect for their lives and worth. In its earlier incarnation as normalisation theory it, more prominently than any contemporary theory, provided justification for the worldwide rejection of segregation of socially devalued people in both physical and social terms. Most notably, it was deeply implicated in freeing people from institutions and mini-institutions, the advancement of inclusive education, the early formation of supported employment, the advancement of advocacy and rights for voiceless and oppressed persons, the challenging of governments, professionals and other authorities to respect the dignity and integrity of devalued people as persons equal to all other persons and so on. Such activities have continued into the present era unabated, but far less prominent as being formally associated with the theory.

In searching for whether the theory has ever been adopted by any group that is hostile in any definitive way to the well-being of marginalized people, it is difficult to identify even one instance of such a group. On the contrary, SRV adherents come from both a cross section of the field, and are at work in virtually all of the progressive movements that can be identified in the field. SRV theory has never been demonstrated to be in favour of a single harmful edict, proposition, doctrine, principle, or figure in the field despite decades of opportunity to do so. In this sense, SRV theory could be argued to have had an enviable moral history of being a catalyst for change when it mattered, of possessing a message that has been demonstrably positive, and for attracting people to adherent status who have clearly aligned themselves with socially devalued people.

It is one thing to note such recognitions at the factual historical level, and to contrast them with what might be said or insinuated about SRV theory at a more popular level. On this perceptual level, SRV theory and its supporters have not been nearly as successful at gaining recognition for their moral track record. In fact, much of the familiarity with the social history that would assure this recognition is now quickly disappearing as a factor with a younger generation, who might well equate SRV theory with something from their parents generation. This is not meant to suggest that anything has changed substantively as to the theory, but it is increasingly less visibly linked to forward progress in the field. Thus, its contemporary moral significance is much more muted in popular perceptions. There are various reasons for this diminishment, but the significant point to note is that SRV theory and its adherents cannot expect that a new generation will automatically embrace a theory that they have yet to appreciate as offering them a compelling way forward.

If SRV is to continue to be a relevant player in the years ahead, it is only natural that it periodically reposition and reinterpret its messages so that it can be demonstrated (yet again) to be of value. It matters little that this was done at an earlier period, as its perceived relevance in the present and near term will be quite entwined with whether it emerges as a voice of positive direction, liberation and practical usefulness to socially devalued people. The fact that SRV is no longer such a “given” may not be ultimately fatal to the theory, as support and interest levels can be expected to vary somewhat across time even for well established theories. Nonetheless, it would not be wise to take any support for granted particularly since the “baby boom” generation is soon to be leaving the field in large numbers, thus eroding much of the “taken for granted” support the theory has enjoyed based on its earlier years.

Making The Substantive/Rational Case

When one considers the many struggles facing socially devalued people in relation to how they are treated by their society, it is a quite worthwhile question as to whether SRV theory offers them any practical hope with the hardships they suffer. Additionally, even if it did, is it really clear to them and their allies that this is so. In this sense, perceived relevance and application of SRV theory may interrelate with actual relevance. If the theory does not achieve a resounding affirmation, at the practical and rational level, as being persuasively helpful, then it should come as no surprise that its adoption by people is lukewarm or unconvinced. The rational and the practical/substantive tests for the theory are certainly not identical, but they are related.

In the theoretical/rational domain, the question is clearly whether the theory explains or illuminates the phenomena it is attempting to address. A strong case can be made that SRV theory does actually speak to the question of social devaluation in a coherent, accessible and testable fashion, at least for competent social scientists and analysts and commonly many others close to the phenomena itself. After all, its action principles and proposals are generally accepted as being in accord with mainstream social science, it articulates rather systematically the scope, social and metaphysical origins and character of the deprivations brought about in the victims of social devaluation, demonstrates the involvement of major social institutions in the transaction of social devaluation, and links all of this to a more universal understanding of the ongoing dynamism of social devaluation as a constant factor across time, culture, groups affected, and other such variables.

It again matters not whether the case for some provisional ongoing measure of adoption of SRV is made at a theoretical level if the theory has no practical utility, as both standards would need to be met to have the theory be persuasive. This is not to suggest that theory adoption is always a rational decision, as most people’s allegiances also have non-rational components. Nevertheless, a rational/substantive standard does exist for most people, at least part of the time, if the arguments involved can be heard above the pressures of vested interests, relationships, loyalties and so on.

Thus for SRV theory, it faces an inevitable recurring necessity to demonstrate that it is simultaneously substantively persuasive at the rational substantive level, potent in terms of practical utility in understanding and overcoming social disadvantage, and capable of being grasped as being so in the clamour for acceptance that accompanies other theories, rival interests and agendas, and the usual politics of any field. This latter instance of making the political case for SRV, is often advanced by approaches that differ quite a bit from those that are successful at the rational discourse level, (or at least the appearance of), and thus often necessitate quite different manners of persuasion. Often as not, it involves finding a way in which people can see that their experience and insights are respected and confirmed in the theory. In social movement terms, this process is often referred to as achieving “frame alignment” or “frame resonance” as a prelude to gaining a degree of support.

SRV can make the case quite successfully that it has been used with good result in such diverse practical matters as accelerating social inclusion, changing harmful perceptions of people, confronting poverty and powerlessness, arguing for employment and equity, obtaining for people real jobs, homes, lives and social role rather than the impoverishments to be found in devalued social roles and so on. Such arguments as these as to its practical benefits do help to gain for it, (or any worthy theory), a constituency of adherents. However, if it fails to periodically demonstrate its actual practical potency then it should be expected that its relevance will be tested and challenged.

How The Theory Is Portrayed and Perceived

Part of the challenge for SRV theory, as well as any other aspiring theory, will always be whether it can relate to people and constituencies that initially see themselves as being quite different in their outlook. This challenge is an ongoing one, and does not always relate to the substance of the theory so much as whether it is communicated in a way that makes it easy or hard for the party targeted to accept. In this respect, all theories bring with them some manner of both substance and context, both of which will influence potential adherents. If the theory is perceived as too radical, it may disquiet the less adventurous or cautious, if it is too closely aligned to persons or groups mistrusted by the perceiver than a “guilt by association” factor may be at work, if it uses language, styles or formats that are disliked by the perceiver, (such as is often true with some patronizing or pretentious academic styles), and so forth.

SRV theory has, on occasion, been portrayed by both its adherents and its critics in ways that have proven to be problematic for the eventual acceptance of the theory. For instance, some of its more uncritical though enthusiastic supporters have occasionally portrayed it almost as being an entire “answer’ in itself, thereby failing to recognise the useful, necessary role and contribution of other theories. This kind of self-assigned exclusivity and quasi-totalistic outlook, while rare, is both at the level of substance and perception, an ill-advised tactic. This is quite apart from such a view being an unhelpful distortion of the substance of the theory.

In other cases, some SRV adherents have unduly emphasized one element of the theory that appealed to them and ignored others. For instance some people emphasize its emphasis on individual change and ignore its extensive address of change at the community and systems level. Others have emphasized only one feature of SRV considerations such as choice, rights, inclusion, social image transformation, and so on without properly grasping that the theory has always argued for the balancing of multiple “well-being’ related considerations, particularly as issues are played out in terms of the specific needs and identity of each person concerned. Such reductionism and subsequent dogmatism are an inevitable part of human nature, and thus not entirely avoidable. Nonetheless, the damage they can cause to the acceptability of a given theory can be considerable.

SRV theory, like all other theories may suffer not only from the failings of its intrinsic substance and the limits of its proponents, it may also acquire any number of negative perceptions due to how its critics choose to portray it. In the case of SRV theory, the criticism is occasionally made that SRV theory is somehow associated with the deprivation of the rights and autonomy of people because it argues for the use of careful change strategies in how people who live under the regime of negative public perceptions are represented or interpreted to the dominant society. Some critics have taken such cautions to somehow indicate that SRV theory endorses all manner of practices that are normative in its advocacy of socially devalued people being able to be treated as equal to others, and in a like manner as valued citizens expect to be treated.

Such a criticism often appeals to many self-styled iconoclasts who consider that any cooperation with the normative structure of society is, on the face of it, a sell-out to the decadent values of society… at least in their terms. Oddly enough, many people who are socially devalued would actually like to enjoy a piece of the “normal” social pie that such critics seem to sneer at, and dismiss in sweeping scornful terms as “middle class values”. In other words, when they get a chance to speak to the life they envision for themselves, it usually includes large amounts of fairly normative personal preferences e.g. friends, incomes, freedom, a home, valued social roles, travel, security, relationships, status, opportunities, respect and so on. It is precisely these things that SRV theory asserts should be made available to such persons. Nowhere does the theory say that a given individual should have these forced upon them against their will, only that these sorts of advantages should be accessible in most cases, should a person voluntarily want or need them.

Even the rather imprecise, but commonly heard refrain, that disabled people, (or any other oppressed group), ought to have the final word on all matters that affect them, is rather rigorously upheld by SRV theory in its consistent insistence that devalued people not be deprived of any of the personal choice options and responsibilities that ordinary citizens are normatively accorded. (This would be distinct from the radical libertarian position that people ought to have anything they want irrespective of society’s rules i.e. license). In fact, SRV theory has long been associated with some of the most heated conflicts in the field in terms of forcing social institutions to accept that socially devalued people deserve the normatively good treatment that other citizens expect for themselves. Where SRV theory is much less romantic and utopian than many perspectives, is in its acknowledgement that there are both people who are of dubious competence that may need assistance with choice amongst other things, and that “choice” is not the only or ultimate need of people, and may have to be balanced with other concerns and needs of the person.

The act of distorting theories to achieve their discredit is a normal polemical device in political struggle, and may not actually be all that bound up with the substance of the theory but rather with the manipulation of impressions. For instance, opponents of some of the early attempts of SRV adherents to challenge segregation were met by counterclaims that SRV was a “radical”, “reckless”, and “unrealistic” strategy that would result in all sorts of ill prepared and vulnerable people “dumped” in community in the name of some sort of fanciful idealism.

Such charges are really pitched at the irrational level in their cultivation of fear producing images that can easily panic the uncertain. As much as rationality oriented people lament such subliminal politics, the reality is that they exist and must be met and countered. Thus SRV theory, like all theories, must deal with these “irrational” political challenges by rather consciously speaking to the emotive and ideological content that particular portrayals of the theory may invoke. As has been indicated earlier, it matters not whether SRV theory actually has a sterling track record of defending and expanding people’s rights in practice, if it cannot counter the perception created in some people’s minds that the theory favours the social order over the aspirations of socially devalued people. This is clearly an indefensible assertion at the factual level, but possibly quite a viable one at another level. It serves as a good example of just the sort of political and perceptual test that will predict whether SRV remain a theory with a constituency.

The Theory’s Appropriate Prominence and Accessibility

It is a kind of truism of politics that visibility is a kind of political capital, at least in terms of legitimacy. This could be somewhat distinguished from prominence that revolves around notoriety, as that variety of notice may undermine legitimacy. Similarly, invisibility is usually associated with absent or low levels of influence. Like practitioners in any field, many of the more organized SRV supporters have concentrated on largely invisible work related to the actual “content” of SRV theory and have consequently relinquished much of the prominent profile that is associated in people’s mind with success. Once one loses political visibility, it is quite easy to then be thought of as no longer being significant. Significance becomes equated to profile rather than substance in the celebrity culture of today’s mass media. Knowing this, many individuals and groups deliberately heighten their visibility in the hope of gaining influence.

This invisibility of SRV, or any other theory, from the public stage, even if for good reason, will nevertheless have some detrimental effects. People and ideas in this position of relative obscurity will, to a goodly number of people, seem to have lost ground. In this way a lack of prominence gets equated with diminished stature in the quite separate and ongoing battle of appearances that is the political life (or “spin”) of all fields. Many a person or group has experienced the ambiguous status of having no prominence whatsoever in the public proclamations and symbolic associations of any of the mainstream organizations in the field that confer legitimacy.

When this thought of in terms of the mainstream political analogies of “profile”, “name recognition”, and “negatives” as they relate to perception it is clear that position and visibility are related…...often irrespective of substance. Such symbolic omissions from the self-interested and conscious projections of influential interest groups ought not be seen as being devoid of political significance. The close juxtaposition of official mainstream authority and any theory obviously holds meaning at the political symbolic level. Much as in the tea leaf reading of Politburo photographs, who was able to appear in official photos and who stood next to whom, were all indicators of favour and influence.

This kind image dilution or enhancement is not unique, as comparable situations are routinely found amongst many other groups who become subject to a political culture of immediacy. Substance is given short shrift in favour of prominence. This recognition can be disorienting for many people, as they may rather innocently assume that the emphasis on rationality and substance that they believe operates in their private world will be observed as faithfully in the public domain. Discovering that this is not so can be an unwelcome revelation. Of course, what needs to be accepted is that the ground in politics is gained much more readily at the level of image and perceptions than at the level of substance and rationality. In fact, habits of rationality can easily be a difficulty when what is being shaped may be more at the irrational and unconscious level. Thus, while a theory may be attacked in terms of content or substance, its ultimate viability within a field may rest more with how it is positioned in terms of its image with the various constituencies involved. This may be so despite the many pious protestations all that really matters is reason and substance.

An error many make, given the seductive short-term advantages that prominence can bring, is to presume that everything is appearance, and that substance is irrelevant. This can be an equally fatal error as that of dismissing appearances as inconsequential. This is because no theory has much of a future if it cannot pass muster with the still numerous people who can readily tell the difference between substance and image. Thus “appropriate” visibility and prominence would be grounded in the credibility that comes with the combination of masterful appearance management and demonstrable and persuasive rigour at the level of substance. It is interesting that despite the exemplary public relations talent available to many agencies, they still cannot ultimately overcome the fact that they fail to impress experts in the field who can readily see that the image lacks substance. Posturing, in the end, cannot replace authentic achievement.

It is a challenge for everyone to get their message across. It may not matter as to the actual merit of the message if it cannot be communicated and understood well by those to be influenced. This is perhaps less a consideration when the message is a rather simple and easily grasped one. However, with theories as complex as SRV theory, being able to communicate the essential outlines both accurately, and with commendable levels of actual comprehension, may be a formidable challenge. This intrinsic difficulty may be compounded by the fact that such theories are often concerning people that society may not be all that interested in. Consequently, the proponent must awaken and sustain interest in the concerns raised by the theory, as well communicate the theory effectively and accurately.

On top of this, it may well be that some elements of the theory may serve to challenge and disturb various interests in society, including people’s rather flattering image of themselves. Consequently, there always exists the challenge of both communicating a theory and finding a way through the complex reactions it invokes. This can be seen in the huge difficulty people with disabilities have had getting people to recognise the paternalistic way that people with visible disabilities get patronised. It can take great tact to get such points across to people, even if the points to be made are indisputable.

The Theory’s Adaptation To The Emerging Realities Of The Field

Theories gain and lose ground by how well they speak to the problems and challenges that people rely on them to help with. If our present strategies in regards to immunology were less efficacious than they presently are then it would be easy to see why people would not rely on them. This point may actually be made clearer to us if our present range of antibiotics fails to protect us from the emergent range of “super bugs” that are now in evidence. It is no different with making the case with other kinds of theories. They all need to be demonstrated to have value in order to maintain a following.

In the instance of SRV theory, there would be very little dispute that it gained prominence because of its central role in overturning the era of segregated institutional dominance. That era is now receding at such a fast rate that it may now be ancient history to the young. For the new generation of activists in the field the challenges they struggle with are not whether most people will have access to the community but rather whether people’s (resultant) lives in the community are the kinds of lives they want, need and deserve. This challenge is not likely to simply be restricted to such broad existential questions, as it may also involve having to select from among various ideological suitors as to which theory promises the greatest rewards to its supporters.

At present, people are asked to place their faith in all sorts of nostrums, theories and what might be thought of as “theory fragments”. How they evaluate and judge these inevitably summons up quite different epistemological starting points and ultimate values. Whether this intersection of metaphysical and practical matters is all that obvious to the participants may not matter, as the consequences are real enough whether one is conscious of it or not. For instance, many people these days are being asked to believe that if they could just acquire individualised funding (or some equivalent), their lives would be measurably improved. Such a naïve belief requires an inordinate faith in the exclusive power of a financing system to overcome the hordes of shortcomings present in the modern human service setting. Sadly, despite their wish to transcend these obstinate limitations, there are all too many people who have individual funding that still remain deeply ensnared in dysfunctional service bureaucracies.

If one looks at the well established historical emphasis that SRV theory places on values, attitudes and expectations as predictors of how well people will be perceived and treated it is much less surprising as to why individualized funding is so ineffectual if it is not linked to a wide range of other social changes. For instance, individualized funding becomes deeply muted in its effects if one has to purchase service or supports from agencies that have no inkling of what creating authentically “person centred” service models or arrangements involves. In this modest instance of the present “flavour of the month” infatuation with panacea-like versions of individualised funding and self-determination rhetoric, there are actually some considerable theoretical challenges that need to be taken up if people are to be responsibly guided through such a maze of claims and counter-claims.

It is precisely because of such challenges that theory can be so helpful to human beings. It can make life a little more manageable if the theory used is sound, and wound people if it is not. A host of contemporary issues would be a lot easier to make progress with if our theories were better developed. For instance, we talk a great deal about social inclusion as a goal but we are actually quite weak in terms of generating inclusion theory that assures a better result. The same could be said about our poor performance in employment, social acceptance of people with significant disabilities, overcoming the massive entrenchment of mini-institutions, the lack of influence consumers and families have on formal services, unremitting poverty and the coming hazards of bioethics, to name a few.

If SRV theory is perceived as not speaking compellingly to these profound and consequential issues, then it ought to be discarded in favour of better theories. For instance, it is obvious that some people equate SRV theory with something like “deinstitutionalisation” since it is regards to such efforts that they were first exposed to it. SRV theory actually goes well beyond such a characterisation, but such a point may be academic if this is not readily apparent to people enmeshed in today’s big issues. The “solution hunger” that makes people desperate for answers, often predisposes them to leap at the next gimmick that comes along. If a theory can be seen to offer them another credible choice by way of forward progress, such despair may be avoidable. This is always the great value of good theory, it spares us from at least some ill considered actions, even if we are never entirely free from the massive uncertainty of life itself.

Conclusion

This paper is not intended to be either a case for the adoption of SRV theory, or an apology for any and all limitations it may possess. Rather, its intent is to erect a sense of what might be the kinds of tests we may need to erect to both evaluate and establish any worthy theory in a position of trust. SRV theory will likely survive well into the future, but survival alone is not the only or sufficient measure of good theory. Theory at its best acts to serve the needs of human beings and to uplift their dignity, potential and capacity to act meaningfully. It does not exist for its own sake, but as a potency that ought to be subordinate to the well-being of people. Consequently, we must come to a determination of whether this is so.